

On the Matter of Aggregate Models for Syllogistic Reasoning: A Transitive Set-Based Account for Predicting the Population

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All scientists are gods
Some gods are immortal

What, if anything, follows?

- Reasoning is a core skill of human cognition
- Core domain: syllogisms, i.e., categorical quantified assertions

Example: Atmosphere Heuristic

All scientists are gods
Some gods are immortal

Logic: No Valid Conclusion

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- Theories try to capture the deviations from logic
- Example: Atmosphere heuristic¹ predicts quantifier
 - by merging quantity and polarity
 - ... but no statement about the direction


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Theories of Syllogistic Reasoning (Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2012)

Heuristics	Formal Rules	Diagrams, Sets & Models
Atmosphere	PSYCOP	Euler Circles
Matching	Verbal Substitutions	Venn Diagrams
Illicit Conversion	Source-Finding	Verbal Models
Probability Heuristics	Monotonicity	Mental Models

- Meta-analysis demonstrates: no single best performing theory
- Heuristic approaches perform worse than model-based approaches

Covering the Most Frequently Given Answer



Are simple heuristic strategies simply *insufficient* for predicting human syllogistic reasoning?

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Can we identify *simple mechanisms* that explain inferences?

- We need to identify fundamental principles of heuristics
- Requirements for good heuristics, they
 - Should work in many practical situations (logically valid when applied correctly)
 - Should not require deep reasoning process (akin to pattern matching)
 - Should leave room for illogical inferences (application in unwarranted cases)

Transitivity is a core principle and good heuristic:

1. Works in practice:

- Basic principle for making inferences

²Goodwin, G. P., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2008). Transitive and pseudo-transitive inferences. *Cognition*, 108(2), 320-352

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- Attempts to find simple paths of information flow (A-B-C)
- Conclusion is intuitive

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3. Room for illogical inferences:

- Transitivity is often applied in unjustified cases (pseudo-transitivity)²
- Participants might force a task into a transitive shape

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- Total of 64 problems consisting of
 - 4 quantifiers (All, Some, Some ... not, None)
 - 4 figures depending on arrangement of terms (A, B, C)

Figure 1	Figure 2	Figure 3	Figure 4
A-B	B-A	A-B	B-A
B-C	C-B	C-B	B-C

- Nine possible conclusions:


Eight conclusions relating end terms (A, C) and “No Valid Conclusion” (NVC)

1. Determine direction

Search for a transitive path and determine the direction of the conclusion

2. Determine quantifier


Propagate a set along the path



Determine Direction: Finding a Transitive Path

Figure 1:


All A are B, Some B are C



- Transitive path directly available (A-B-C)
- Analogously possible for Figure 2 (C-B-A)
- Directly yields A-C (Figure 1) and C-A direction (Figure 2)

Figure 3:

All A are B, Some C are B




- No direct path available
- Assumption: Reasoners change task structure to enforce a path
- NVC if path cannot be found

Determine Direction: Finding a Transitive Path


Figure 3:

All A are B, Some C are B




- Premises with universal quantifiers (All, No) treated bidirectionally
- Yields same path structures as for Figure 1 and Figure 2 syllogisms
- Same mechanism for Figure 4 syllogisms


Determine Quantifier: Set Propagation




Determine Quantifier: Set Propagation




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


Determine Quantifier: Set Propagation - Conflict



- Ambiguity of “No” as first quantifier: Empty set vs “All A are no B”
 - Empty set: No statement about elements of A
 - “No A are B” interpreted as “All A are no B”
- Set propagation fails

Determine Quantifier: Set Propagation - Conflict Resolution




- Start from the end of the path
- Bidirectional interpretation if second premise quantifier is "All"
- Simplifies ambiguity and leads directly to the conclusion



Comparison of models with most-frequent answer (MFA)

- MFA is the optimal response strategy for aggregate prediction models
- **Coverage**: Check if MFA is in set of possible model predictions
- **Accuracy**: Discount coverage score based on number of possible predictions



MFA Analysis



MFA Analysis





MFA Analysis



- TransSet achieves peak performance


MFA Analysis




- TransSet achieves peak performance
- Cognitive models drop in performance when penalized for multiple responses
 - Highlights unspecificity of model predictions
 - Suggests severe shortcomings of the predictive forms of the models

- Investigate how applicable reasoning strategies are to individual reasoners
- For individuals, evaluate the predictive accuracy on their responses (proportion of correct predictions)
- Heuristic models should be able to accurately predict a small number of participants and perform rather poorly on the rest

Individualized Analysis



Individualized Analysis



- Complex models are unsuitable, unless they can fine-tune predictions
- Large variance of MFA predictions
 - Highlights the limit of aggregation-based strategies
 - “Average reasoner” is an unsuitable representation for an individual

- TransSet is able to capture human reasoning data fairly well while adhering to known statistical effects and psychological phenomena:
 - Figural effect (Johnson-Laird, 1983)
 - Conversion (Chapman & Chapman, 1959)
 - Informativeness of quantifiers (Chater & Oaksford, 1999)
- Occam's Razor: questions worth of complex fit-based models
 - Unnecessary for modeling syllogistic reasoning unless able to be fine-tuned to individuals
 - TransSet as a simple heuristic suffices for population-based aggregate predictions

References

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Code on GitHub:

<https://github.com/Shadownox/iccm-transset>



Model Flow

